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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF u·TAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case N'o. 9'778

DE'NNIS SHERMAN KINDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'T
STATEMENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE
AppeHant has appealed from His conviction of
robbery and grand larceny in the Third J udici'al
District Court, State of u·tah.
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
The respondent submits the foHowing statement of facts !as being a fuller coverage of the evirenee presented at trial.
On ·October 30, 1961, Daniel L. Kelly, an employee of the .A:l Harris Dairy Milk Depot in Salt
Lake City, was robbed by a m'an carrying a smallblue-black gun of a larger caliber than a .22 ( R104) The robbery took place at ·about 8 o'clock p.m.
1
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The robber wore a red bandana wrapped around
the top part of his head, but the robber's face was
exposed and he appeared to have been unshaven for
about four days. (R-105) Mr. Kelly observed the
robber for about 30 seconds duri'ng the holdup. The
robber 'took about $156.83 according 'to 'Mrs. Harris,
the proprietor ( R-144) . After the robbery occurred,
Mr. Kelly, :an ex-convict, called the police. (R-93,
94). The pol'ice made a routine investigation (R-9299). Mr. I\jeHy, after the robbery, identified 'a picture of 'a m!an, nat the appeHan't, as being the robber.
Thereafter, after being shown a pitcture of the appellant, he identified the appellant as the robber
( R-11 0) . At the time of trial, Mr. Kelly was confined in the Utah Sta:te Prison, and 'at 'the 'time of
the robbery was :an ex-convict (R-104, 108). Kelly,
at the trial, 'identified the appellant ·as the robber.
(R-107).
Lieutenant N. B. Hayward of 'the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office 1testified that during an interrogation of the appeHant in December, 1961, or
J!anuary, 1962, the appellant admitted the AI Harris
Dairy robbery ( R-112) .
The day before the robbery, Henry Piep, the
appeUant's half-brother, saw the appellant and helped him paint a truck in which the appellan t intended
to go to Arizona (R-11'5). He noted 'that the appell1ant hlad two small hand guns 'in his possession at
tha:t time. (R-116).
1

2
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The a ppeHan t testified that. he left Salt Lake
City on the morning of October 30, 19'61, for Arizona, and that at 8 o'clock p.m. he was about 100
miles from Flagstaff, Ari21ona ( R-118). The !appellant further testified that he rented a motel in
Flagstaff at about 8 to 8:30p.m. (R-119). He further stated that he arrived in Tucson, Arizona, the
next morning at about 10:30 \a.m. This would have
been October 31, 1961. ( R-119) . On ·cross-examination, the prosecutor asked without objection the
means by which appellant got ·to AriznnJa, and was
told that appellant drove a 1955 Ford pickup truck
(R-119). Appellant also testified tha:t the truck was
registered to Robert Reed, 'but that he did not know
Mr. Reed's address (R-120). ·Testimony was given
to the license plates on the car, and the persons who
accompanied Kinder to Arizona. Kinder stated that
upon arrival in Tucson he and his female complanions
registered at a motel, but denied that State's Exhibit 3 was a registration card bearing his signature (R-124). Kinder admitted having two pistols
in his possession, one of which was a .32 caliber,
and also he admitted a convi'ction for a felony (R125). No objection to all the above testimony was
regi'stere'd. The only objection registered by counsel
that the prosecution was exceeding the bounds of
cross-examin:ation was to the following question
(R-1'26) :
1

3
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"Q. Prior to October 30th of 1961, when did
you arrive in Salt Lake?"
Thereafter, no further objection was imposed,
and on cross-examination, appellant sta:ted that he
ol11Jained 'the pickup truck, in which he had previously te~stified to having travelled to Arizona in, in California and did not acquire it 'in Sialt Lake City (R127). Subsequently, the prosecutor again attemp'ted
to have the appellan t admit Exhihi t 3 was subscribed by him, which he refused ~to admit (R-128). Exhibit 3 was not adm'rtted in evidence, but from the
record would appear to 'be :a motel signature card
bearing the name R. ID.nder, Jr., a vehicle description, and a date of November 1, 19'61.
1

1

Thereafter, the prosecutor continued without
objection (R-133) :
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) Mr. Kinder, wh'a:t
was the color of the pickup that you drove out
of Salt L'ake?
A. Brown.
Q. Solid brown?
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, tell me the colors of it, please.
A. It had a black top, very top.
Q. I can barely hear you.
A. I said the top, the very top was black.
Q. What else?
A. That's all.
4
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Q. What was the other color of 'the truck?
A. Pardon?
Q. What were the other colors of the truck?
A. I told you, brown and bal1ck.
Q. What were the colors of the W eels?
A. Black, I guess.
Q. Well, didn't you paint this truck on the
30th with your stepbrother, Henry Piep?
A. Yes, sir, he helped me.
Q. What colors did you paint it?
A. I told you.
MR. McRAE : If the Court please, this
witness has testified as to alibi and whether he
pain ted this truck has no bearing on alibi.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Leary) What colors did you
paint it?
A. Black.
Q. Solid black?
A. No.
Q. Well, what parts did you paint then?
A. The top.
Q. Just the top of the cab?
A. Right.
Q. Nothing else?
A. No, sir, I don't think so.
Q. All right. And that was identically the
5
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same color when you arrived 1n Tucson, Is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir."
The appellant was then questioned (R-139) relative
to his arrival in S'alt Lake, all without objection:
"Q. Were you on October 29th?
A. No, s'ir.
Q. And isn't it a fact that you did not arrive
in Salt Lake until October 29th of 1961, Mr.
Kirrder?
A. I arrived in s~alt Lake before that.
Q. Did you ever have a conversation with
anyone converning the dlate of your arrival
in Salt Lake?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have a conversation with Officer
Lyman of the Salt Lake City Po1ice Department concerning the time of your arrival in
Salt Lake?
A. No, sir. I'd like to refer back to that first
question. The ~a:st question. I did have a conversation When I first arrived in Salt Lake.
Q.- With whom?
A. With my older brother.
Q. Where did you stay when you were in
Salt Lake?
A. I went to see my parents at first.
Q. Where did you stay when you arrived
in Salt Lake, Mr. Kinder?
A. I told you, I wen't to see my parents first.
6
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Q. Did you remain in a house in S!alt Lake?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Where?
A. At 3150 South 9th East.
Q. And you stayed with your parents there?
A. For a while.
Q. How many days?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was it one?
A. No, it was more than one.''
Thereafter, the appellant objected that tJhe mlatter was outside the scope of direct examination and
the prosecutor abandoned the line of questioning
(R-140).
Officer Donald Lyman testified that the appellant had told him he !arrived in Salt Lake City
on October 29, 1961, and that he acquired 'the pickup
truck in Salt Lake City from a used car lot, and
then painted the vehicle (R-149, 1'50). In no way
did Officer Lyman or anyone say that the 'truck hlad
been stolen.
Subsequent to appeal, appellant filed two affidavi'ts set out in his brief, one from Kelly 'an!d the
other from another inmate, in which Kelly said that
Kinder was not the robber. The other prisoner's
'affidavit said he heard Kelly say the same thing.
No motion for new trial has been addressed to
the 'trral court, nor 'any petition for coram nobis.
7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE .A:PPELLANT CANNOT BE GRANTED A NEW
TRIAL ON THE CLAIM OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE BECAUSE:
A. NO MOTION OR PETITION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE TRIAL COURT.
B. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE WEIGHED
BY THE TRIAL JUDGE WHO HEARD THE CASE
AND HE, IN HIS DISCRETION, S'HOULD FIRST DETERMINE WHETHER THE NE'W TRIAL OR OTHER
RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED.
C. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A NEW
TRIAL WOULD NOT JUSTIFY SUCH AN ORDER.

A. It is submi'tted by the respondent that appellant may not, for 'the first time on appea1, raise
the question of whether the claimed newly discovered eviden'ce would warrant this court in granting
a new tri,al. The Utah law on new trials is covered
in Title 77, Chapter 38, Utah Code Annotated 195'3.
Section 77-38-3 (7), U.C.A. 1H5'3, provi1des that a
new trial may be a warded:
"(7) When new evidence has been discovered, m'ateri'al to 'the defendant and which he
could not with reasonable diligence have dis·covered and produced at the tri'al."
The same Section further notes that the trial court
shall have a hearing on an ·application for ;a new
tri'a:l. See also 77-38-4, Utah Code Anno'tated 1953.
The statute therefore contemplates that an application for a new trial must be directe'd to the trial
8
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court. In, State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d
(1949) the Court quoted the following with approval:
" 'It is a matter now too well settled to admit
of any serious dispute * * * that the question
of granting or denying a motion for new trial
is a matter largely within the discretion of
the trial court. * * * This rule applies whether
the motion is based upon insufficiency of the
evidence or upon newly discovered evidence.
* * * This court cannot substitu1te its discretion for that of the trial court. * * * We do
not ordinarily interfere wi'th rulings of the
trial court in either granting or denying ia
motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or
failure to exercise, discretion on the part of
the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the ruling of the trial judge will be sustained.
'The granting or denial of a moiton for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is a matter within the trial court's discretion, which is conclusive unless abuse of
discretion is shown.' "
Consequently, it would appear tha:t the decisions of
this Court have contemplated that an application
for a new trial be addressed to the trial court. The
Legislature has also provided by implication since
77-38-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
"The application for a new trial must be made
upon written notice of motion designating the
grounds upon which it is made, and must be
served and filed within five days after the
rendition of the verdict or decision. * * *."
9
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If the matter is to be heard within five days of the
tri:al, which was not done in this case, the obvious
conclusion is tha:t the matter should be directed to
the trial court. The general rule is noted in 24 C.J.S.,
Criminal Law, § 146'5:
"As a general rule, and in the absence of some
statutory provisions pLacing the power elsewhere, the jurisdiction to grant a new trial,
and to enterta'in an application therefor, rests
in fue court in which the trial was had, even
though a motion for a new trial is not essential to :a review by an appellate court; and,
ordinarily, no other court can exercise jurisdiction in this respect. * * *."
and at page 230, 24 C.J.S., ·supra:
"An appellate court has ordinarily no power
to entertain a motion for a new trial in a
court of first ins·tance subject to its appellate
jurisdiction, and under constitutioll!al and statutory provisions it has been held that a particular appellate court had no power to entertain an ~application for new trial. Neither,
under constitutional provisions specifying tha:t
the jurisdiction of an appellate court shall be
appellate only, may such court direct the trial
judge in a court of original jurisdiction to
entertain a motion for new trial. * * *"
In this regard, it should be noted that Article
VIII, Section 4, of the U ta:h Constitution provides
that except fDr the extraordinary writs, the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court will be appeHate
only. Consequently, since the claim of newly dis10
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covered evidence has never been passed on by the
trial court, this court may not review the evidence.
B. Even were the evidence presented by the
affidavits filed by the appellant deemed convincing,
that evidence should be weighed by the trial judge
that heard the evidence. Thus, 24 C.J.S., Crimilllal
Law, p. 228 notes:
"As a general rule, the judge who presided at
the trial is the proper judge to hear and determine a mo'tion for a new trial. The ends of
justice would generally thus be better served."
Since the trial judge tha;t heard the case is still
available, and since he had an opportunity to weigh
the evidence first hand, view the demeanor of the
witness, and appraise their credibility, he would
be the person best suited to ascertain whether or
not the present allegations of Mr. Kelly are true
or whether his change of mind is based on a change
of circumstances.
Nor, is the appellant's position prejudiced by
the fact that he failed to make a motion for new
trral within five days as required by 77-38-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, since he may, of course, proceed by coram nobis, State v. Woodard, 108 Utah
390, 160 P. 2d 432 ( 1945) ; Neal v. Beckstead, 3
Uta:h 2d 403, 285 P. 2d 129 ( 19'55) ; and the same
rule, that the petition should be directed 'to the 'tri'a'l
judge and court that heard the case, i's applicable.
Bolton v. State, 223 Ind. 308, 60 N.E. 2d 74'2;
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ernst v. State, 181 Wis. 155, 193 NW 978; 30 Am.
J ur., Judgments, Sec. 736.
C. It is submrtted finally that the evidence
contained in the affidavits is not sufficient to warrant this court or any other court granting relief,
v~a coram nobis or new tri~ai. The affidavit of Charles
G. Anderson is merely an impeaching ·statement and
will not support a motion for new tri1al. State v.
Hawkins, 81 Utah 16, 1'6 P. 2'd '713; Jeter v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 285, 104 S.W. ·2d 979; 24 C.J.S.
Criminal Law, Sec. 14·60.
Kelly's affidavit must be 'taken in conside~ation
of the fact that it states that he made a mistake
in his identity and changed his mind. the 'affidavit
is gener:ally equivocal, and it should be remembered
that Kelly, Anderson and Kinder are all confined
together in prison. In People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S. 2d
214 ( 1946) the New York eourt recognized the perjurious and concocted recantations of a state's witness would not be such newly discovered evidence
as would justify setting aside ~a judgment on coram
nobis. The court noteed that recantations must be
viewed in consideration of 'the circumstances in which
they were made.
In the instant 'case, there is still substantial
evidence connecting the a ppeUant to the crime. First,
his half brother testifield to seeing him in possession
of gun·s the day before the robbery. Second, appel12
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lant admitted the possession of two ·pistols. Third,
appellant admi'tted the crime to police officers.
Fourth, appellant just happened to leave for Arizona at a time close to the time of the robbery, after
changing the color of his vehicle. The 'above facts
when viewed against Kelly's guarded and equivocal
affidavit, and the fact ·that the affidavft was made
at the Pri1son where both were serving, make it
manifest that the "newly discovered evi'dence" is
not of su~h a nature that, had the jury had such
evidence in addition to that presented, appellant
would probably have been ·acquitted. Ward v. Turner,
1'2 Utah 2d 310, 366 ·p. 2d 72 (1961).
POINT II.
NO ERROR REQUIRING REVE-RSAL WAS CREATED BY THE PROSE CUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION.
1

In the appellant's second point he contends that
the trial court ·committed error in the cross-ex:amination of the appellant ·(1) because the evidence elicited tenided to prove the commission of another
crime, and ( 2) the cross-examination exceeded 'the
scope of direct examination.
As to both points, it is submitted tha't the :appellant can make no cl·aim for relief because he
waived these objections at trial. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the appellant how he got
to ·Tucson, Arizona, the type of vehicle he used, who
13
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the vehicle was registered to, whether the vehicle
was registered in Utah, and the State in which the
license plates were issued which it carried (R-119,
120, 1'21). No objection was made to any of this
testimony.
Thereafter, the prosecutor cross-examined the
appellant as to his activi'ties while in Tucson and
what he did upon arrival. The first objection of
counsel on scope of cross-e:)damination, or any dther
objection relevant to the claim on appeal is when
counsel objected to a question as to when the appellant arrived in Salt L'ake City prior to October 30,
1961, the day appellant said he left for Arizona
( R-126). The objection wa:s expressly limited to
contention that 'the time appellant arrived in Salt
Uake City had no "be'aring" on the case. The prosecutor indicated it w.as prelimin'ary inquiry -concerning the vehicle, which point appellant had previosly
testified concerning and wrthou!t objection ( R-1'26).
The objection was overruled (R-127). Thereafter,
the following questions were asked again without
further objection (R-1'27):
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) When di'd you !arrive
in Sal t Lake prior to October 30th of 1961?
A. I don''t rem~ember the exact date.
Q. How did you come 'to Salt Lake?
A. How did I come to Salt Lake?
Q. Yes. In what type of· vehicle?
1
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A. You mean prior to this date?
Q. Yes.
A. I come by car.
Q. You didn't h'ave a pickup truck until you
got to Salt Lake, i'S that right?
A. No,sir.
Q. How many days prior to October 30th did
you acquire the 1955 Ford Pickup truck that
you were talking about?
A. In the time I went back to- in 'the time
from v;hen I went to ·California and back.
Q. Well, let me 1ask it thi's way. You stated
that this vehicle belonged to Robert Reed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you don't know his address.
A. No, sir, I don't know his a:ddres~s.
Q. All right. Did you acquire 'th'i's vehicle
in Salt Lake City, the Ford pickup truck?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever state to anyone that you
ha:d?
A. No, sir.
Q. Nuw, it was in this same pickup truck
that you drove to Tucson, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. Now Mr. Kinder, I'll show you
again State's proposed Exhibit No. 3 and I'll
ask you to examine the exhibit aguin and tell
me whether or not any of the writing that
appears thereon was written by you?
A. No."
1
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Subsequently, after attempts 'by the prosecutor to get
appellant to admit Exhibit 3, the m·dtel card, W1as
in his handwriting, the prosecutor ~continued without
objection ( R-1'33) :
"Q. (By Mr. Leary) Mr. Kinder, what was
the co'lor of the pickup that you drove out of
Salt Lake?
A. Brown.
Q. Solid brown?
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, 'tell me the colors of it, please.
A. It had a bl:ack top, very top.
Q. I can barely he'ar you.
A. I said the fbop, the very top was 'black.
Q. What else?
A. Tha t's all.
Q. What wa's the other color of the truck?
A. Pardon?
Q. W'hJat were the other colors of the truck?
A. I told you, brown and black.
Q. What were the colors of the wheels?
A. Black, I guess.
Q. Well, didn't you pain't this truck on the
30th with your stepbrdther, Henry Piep?
A. Yes, sir. He helped me.
Q. What colors did you painlt it?
A. I told you.
1
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MR. McRAE : If the Court please, this
witness has testified as to alibi and whether
he painted this truck has no bearing on alibi.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Leary) What colors did you
paint it?
A. Black.
Q. Solid black?
A. No.
Q. Well, wha:t parts did you paint them?
A. The top.
Q. Just the top of the cab?
A. Right.
Q. Nothing else?
A. No, sir, I don't think so.
Q. All right. And 'that was the identically
the s'ame color when you arrived in Tucson,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you registered in the motel?
A. What motel?"
The only objection registered to the last quoted matter was to m'a!teriality not to scope. Finally, (R-138,
139) 'the same questions 1as to the appellant's arrival
in Salt Lake were asked !and answers taken without
objection. Based on the above, it i's submitted th'at
appellant waived any claim he may have had by
( 1) not making his objection on the correct grounds,
1
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State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P. 2d 72'5 (1947);
State v. Mathews, 375 P. 2d 39'2 (U'tah 1962), and
('2) by initially allowing evidence to come in without objection with reference to the vehicle and not
continuing his objections of the time of arr'ival in
Salt Lake. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed.,
§ 348 notes:
"It is a general rule that, in order to take advantage of the admission of evidence by the
tri:al court as error and to secure a reversal
of its judgment upon appeal, the evidence must
be objected to in the trial court. * * *"
Secondly, it is submi'tted that the evidence in
no way tends to show thaJt 'the iappellant committed
any other crime except by ~the mos't flexible im'agination. It irs obvious from the record thaJt the prosecutor was endeavoring to l'ay a sufficient foundation connecting the appeHant Wi th the motel registration card, Exhibit 3, by wh'ich he would ·destroy
the appellant'·s alibi. N'O where in the record does
it appear that the prosecutor rasked the appellant
whetther he bought or stole the vehicle, nor were any
prejudicial remarks made tlra't could be deemed accusatory as was the case in State v. Dickson, 12 Utah
2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961). The means by which
1appellant travelled to Arizona, ~he motel registration and the circumstances surrounding his leaving
Salt Lake were all directly relevant to the validity
1
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of his .claim of alibi. SiJ.lce no tangible evidence was
before the jury except s'trniried supposition tha;t
would allow them to conclude that appell'anrt stole
the vehicle in which he traveiled to Arizona, and
since defense counsel m·ade no objection or side bar
asserti1on ~to the ·court that such Wlas wha;t the prosecutor was endeavoring to ·show, and finally, since
the prosecutor's obvious intention was to lay a :foundation for Exhibit 3 with which to impe·ach the appellant as to the time he left Sal1t Lake, no reasonable basis to claim that the prosecu'tor !attempted to
prove andther crime is supportable.
'Third, it is subm!~ted tha1t even if the prosecutor had shown that appellant stole !the vehicle with
which he went 'to Arizona, such would be :admissible. The facts would show that the day before the
robbery, ~the ·appellant possessed two hand guns,
one of which was similar to tha:t used in the robbery,
thaJt the aJ;>pellan t changed the color of the vehicle
he used, the next day or so, in going to Arizona.
This evidence, if coupled with a sh!owing 'that the
appeUan't ·stole the vehicle the day or so befrore the
ro'l1bery, would 'tend to show a plan or design for
committing the crime 1an'd then fleeing the state. In,
State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 27 4, 114, P. 2d 205
(1941) this court approved a showing th!a:t the defendant had stolen other sheep than those with
which he was charged with stealing. The court said:
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"On the question of proof of other offenses,
the rule is tha:t a defendant, on trial for a certain offense, must be convicted if at all by
evidence showing he is guHty of tha:t offense
alone, and proof of his commission of other
unconnected crimes must be excluded. Excep~
tions to the rule are found in such situations
as those in which the prosecution is permitted
to prove the identifica:tion of the accused, motive, intent, plan, or knowledge. * * * And it
is also competent to show that the offense
cHarged Was part of a common scheme which
may include one or more o'ther offenses. * * *"
In, State v. Harries, 118 U'tah 2'60, 2'21 P. 2d
605 (1950), 'the appellant was convicted of receiving a bribe. Evidence of dther offenses, selling liquor
to private ·clubs, was admitted to show a common
scheme or desiign. This court noted:
"It is asserted by 'the defendant that evidence
of other offenses, particularly with reference
to the sale of liquor to other clubs, Wlas inadmissible as to tended to convict defendant
of crimes with which he was hot charged.
Evidence of other offenses 'is admi'ssihle when
such evidence has a tendency diredtly 'to establish the particular crime. In addition, evidence
of other like crimes is usually competent to
prove a specific crime when it tends to establish mdtive, intent, the :a:bsence of mi'stake or
accident, or a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of 'two or more crimes so
related to each other than proof of one tends
to establish the others. Any pertinent fact
wh1ich throws light upon the subject under
judicial consideration, the accused''s guilt or
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innocense of the crime for which he is charged,
is admissible. Such fact is not ·to be excluded
merely because it m1ay also prove or 'tend to
prove that the accused has committed another
similar crime. Relevant and material evidence
does not become irrelevant or immaJterial
merely because it points to other offenses."
See also State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P. 2d
(1940).
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd., Col. II, § 2'38 com" Any act, which under the circumstances and
according to experience as naturally inJterpreted and applied would indicate 1a probable
design, is relevant and admissible."
The evidence of stealing a vehicle, and painting
it, would clearly indicate preparation for flight
after ·fue anticipated commission of the robbery.
Johnson v. State, 70 Okl. Cr. 270, 106 P. 2d 149. As
Wigmore notes, this ·rs prim'arily a matter of the
trial 'Court's discretion, and here where there is a
logical connection between the two offenses the
'probative value" of such evidence is apparent and
no c~aim of error is supporta:ble. State v. Torgerson,
4 Utah 2d 5'2, 286 P. 2d 800 (1955) ..
Fourth, it is submi~~ted that the evidence introduced did ndt exceed the proper bounds of 'the
scope of direct examination, even if it is deemed
there was no waiver of the issue. In the instant
case, the appellant ;contended by way of alibi that
at the time of the commission of the crime alleged
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he Wias on his way to Arizona. The appellant did
not clearly object ·to any of the testimony relating
to ownership of the veh'ilcle, and on page 127 of
'the record, it i1s noted ~that 1the prosecutor went into
the date of acquisition of the vehicle. ·This wa·s a~ter
an objection (R-1'26) which was directed to the
scope of examination !and relevancy. See ·Page 14,
infra.
The objection m:ade was the only obj~ction as
to ·scope of examination. I't is submitted that the examination was proper. It i's noted that by virtue
of Section 77-44-2, ·utah Code Annota!ted 19'5"3, the
rul~s of evidence relating Ito .scope of cross-examinlation ·'are those generally appJilcable in civil cases.
State v. Murphy, 9'2 Utah 382, 68 P. 2d '1'88 '(193'7).
Therefore, error would only be claimable if the information sought as to the 'time of acquisition of the
vehicle was beyond the rea·somble 'scope of crossexam'in:ation permi1ssible from the direct examination. I't is submitted 'that it was 'an appropriate
exercise of the trial court''s discretion. The general
rule in· this area is. ndted in Abbott, Crimirwl Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., § 313:
"By the English rule which is followed in
·several of the states ;a witness who has sworn
and gives some evidence, however formal or
unimportant, m~ay be cross-examined in relation 'to all matters involved in the issues. But
a stricter rule, sometime's called by way of
distin'Ction the 'American rule.' obtains in the
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Federal and very many of the s~tate courts.
Under this rule the cross-examination of a
witness is limited to an inquiry as to the facts
and circumstances connected with the matters
stated in his direct eXJamination. In the appiication of this rule much is left to the discretiiOn of the trial court.
Under the usual 'interpretation of this rule
a cross-examina:tion always may include whatever tends to qualify or explain the direct
testimony of a witness 1and to develop and
unfold the whole transaction about which he
has only been partially interrogated.''
The weight of recent opinion as to the proper
rule to be promulga:ted favors wide latitude. McCormi1ck, Evidence, § 27 ; Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd
Ed., §§ 1886-1889; Degnan, Non-Rules Evidence
Law: Cross-Examination, 6 Utah L. Rev., p. 323,
330 (19'58), Model Code of Evidence, Rule 105(h).
Although the Utah court has not adopted the
English rule, i~t will appear from an analysis of the
more recent ·cases from this coutt on the 'subject
tha:t the more restrictive rule is not necessarily the
applicable standard, but ra:ther one of reasonable
discretion is arppropos. The appellant's principal reliance is placed on the case of State v. Vance, 38
Utah 1, 110 P1ac. 434 (1910). 1 This ·case is clearly
distinguishable from the instant one since the defedant limited his testimony to the poisoning of
his wife, whereas 'the prosecutor was allowed :to go
1 This case has been soundly criticized. Degnan op. cit., p. 335.
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into instances of beatings given by defendant to his
wife. The insttan't case is no where near so flagT~ant.
Further, the Vance case was burdened by some misapprehensions of constitutional problems, again not
raised or directly present here.
In, State v. Murphy, supra, this court ·sta'ted:
"* * * reviewing cour't ought to be very careful, and should hesitate long before reversing
judgments upon the ground that the trial
court either restricted or enlarged the scope
of cross-examination.''
The court further noted that generally the scope
of cross-examination was a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court. See also McCormick,
Evidence, § 24, p. 4 7 :
"Accordingly the earlier and even many of
the recent cases in jurisdictions adopting the
resltric~tive rule in an yof its forms, emphasize
the power of the trial judge to allow devia-tion's in his di8cre1tion. Tt has been ·said, indeed, that both the courts fiollowing the wideopen and those adop'ting the restri~tive practice 'recognize the discretionary power of the
trial court to allow varia;tions from the custom'ary order and decline ordinarily to consider as 1an error any variation sanctioned by
the trial court.' "
The ca.Jse of In r.e Bryan's Estate, 82 lTtab 390.
25 P. 2d 602 ( 1933). 'This court said as to the latitude of cross-examination, p. 403, Utah Reports:
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thing consisting entirely of new material, but
is a denial of the allegations made by the contestant and where by cross-examination the
proponent seeks to di sprove the very case the
witness has made for the party calling him.
1

* * *"
Clearly, where the i'ssue is one of alibi, as in
the ins:tant case, which amounts to 'a general denial
of the crime rather than some affirm~ative defense,
the Bryans Estate rule allowing great latitude 'should
be allowed. The inquiry as 'to the time of 'acquisition
of the vehicle was directly of concern to explain
and rebut the :appellant'S alibi since it was connected
to 'the question of the means used by the appellant
to get to his place of ·claimed alibi. Further, since Exhibit 3 would appear to have refuted that alibi and
impeached the accused, it was necessary to establish
that the vehicle registered on Exhibit 3 was the
same one as was owned or possessed by appellant,
and consequently, the time and place of acquisition
was directly connected wl!th the overall claim of
alibi. It is submitted that such inquiry was properly
a ma:tter · within the 'Sound d!scretion of the trial
judge~

Finally, it is submitted 'thaJt the limited inquiry
as to the time of acquisition of 'the vehicle, even if
excessive as to scope of examination, was not prejudicial to the appeHan t in view of his admiissions
of guilt, his proximity and connection wi1th the crime
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and the tools of commission of the crime, and the
obvious perjury of the appellant viza vis Exhibit 3.
The Legislature has stated that a case will not be
reversed except for substan!tial errors effecting the
rights of an accused. Error will not be presumed.
Sec. 77-42-1, U.C.A. 19'53. Clearly, such a si~tuartion
of harmless error is the best that can be made out
here. 2
CONCLUSION
The appellant has approached the wrong court
in his eff:ort 'to seek a new trial, and 'therefore has
no righ t to such an order from this court. Appellant's contention on proof of other crimes is not
well taken since ( 1) i1t was W1aived; ( 2) it did in
fa·ct not prove other crimes and (3) even if it did,
it was relevant to show a de'Sign and preparation
for the crime. Secondly, the evidentiary claim on
exceeding the scope of direct examination is not
well taken since ( 1) it W1as waived; ('2) the proper
bounds of cross-examination was n6t exceeded and
1

1

2 Appellant has also contended that the evidence allowed for impeachment on a collateral matter, apparently contending that the
rebuttal of appellant's testimony on the acquisition of the vehic'le
was of such a nature. The rebuttal testimony would only be im.;.
peachment on a collateral matter if such matter was neither relevant nor material to the case. MC'Gormick, Evidence, p. 101 et seq;
Anderson v. Thmnas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142 (1945); State
v. Nell, 59 Utah 68, 202 Pac. 7 (1921). The trial judge's opinion in
this area is directly persuasive of this issue. He said:
"Well, the court has ruled previously and the court feels that
the truck is 'integrally wrapped up in the alibi situation; that
'is, the vehicle with whi·ch, according to the defendant's testimony, he went from Salt Lake City to Tucson."
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(3) if the bounds of 'the trial court's discretion
was exceeded, it was not prejudicial.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRAT'T KESLER
.A:ttorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Deputy Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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